DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 239 147 CG 017 191

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TITLE The Concept of Race in the History of Social Psychology.
PUB DATE 28 Aug 83
NOTE 22p.; Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (91st, Anaheim, CA, August 26-30, 1983).
PUB TYPE Information Analyses (070) -- Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Blacks; Cultural Differences; Evaluation; Intelligence Differences; Opinion Papers; *Race; *Racial Attitudes; Racial Relations; Social History; *Social Psychology; *Social Theories
IDENTIFIERS Eugenics

ABSTRACT

From its beginning, the United States has been a multiracial society, and from the beginning relations between and among the races have been strained by cultural, economic, social, political, and psychological conflicts. Social psychology came of age in the early 1900's as a disciplined inquiry into the psycho-social problems of the people, and central among them was the matter of race. The concept of race was intimately associated with the basic question of the nature of man. A review of the literature of Darwin, Binet, Terman, and the British Utilitarians shows that those who argued the question of social engineering for the betterment of society failed to appreciate the basic principle of the evolutionary theory, namely, that species survival was based on adaptibility enhanced by variability and diversity. Race continued to be a vital concept in the foundations of social psychology as the genetic interpretation of human motivation and performance gave way to an environmental one. In more recent times, social psychology has begun to lose interest in the concept. This process can be roughly divided into 25-year cycles: (1) bio-eugenic origins and racial/cultural differences (1900-1925); (2) socio-cultural influences and socio-political action, the Negro problem (1926-1955); and (3) social integration and experimental control, diverging paths in social psychology (1955-1983). Currently the concept of race appears to be diminishing in importance as an experimental variable, a social/moral problem, and a theoretical concept. Yet social psychology has failed to present a rounded, integrated view of the complex interactions of individual and normative factors in human behavior. The developent of a fully conceived, researched, and applied concept of race would make a great contribution to the maturity and significance of social psychology. (JAC)

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THE CONCEPT OF RACE IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association, Anaheim, CA, August 28, 1983.

The Concept of Race in the History of Social Psychology*

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Introduction

From its beginning, the United States has been a multiracial society. Also from the beginning, relations between and among the races have been strained by cultural, economic, social, political and psychological conflicts. Social psychology came of age in the early 1900's as a disciplined inquiry into the psycho-social problems of the citizenry of this country, and a central tenet of that inquiry was the matter of race.

In fact, so prominent was the question of race and racial differences that McDougall (1921) was moved to refer to the newly emerging IQ tests as the work of "Mental Anthropology." The concept of race was intimately associated with the basic question of the nature of man. Two strains of work in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; namely, Darwinian notions of the origins and evolution of species, and Binet and Terman's development and adaptation of IQ tests to popular and widespread uses combined to give social psychologists a mission. If survival and perpetuation of the species is determined by genetic fitness (a loose interpretation of Darwinian notions) and if the new devices for assessing intelligence (felt to have a basic genetic component could measure genetic fitness, then social science, it was reasoned, could be the foundation of principles of social engineering that would help the development of this society toward maximum civilized advancement.

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*This paper was presented at a symposium on the History of the Concept of Race in Psychology, sponsored by Division 26, History of Psychology, the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Anaheim, California, August 28, 1983.

As stated earlier, this society has always been a multiracial one. The fact of a multiracial population in a time of basic racist and racialist political philosophy led social scientists to make several assumptions and propose basic social plans that at the least could be described as inimical to the well being of people of color. Playing up the popularity of Darwinian ideas, but following more closely the British Utilitarians such as Spencer (1895) and Bentham (1879), this approach argues simply that the fit should be protected and encouraged to thrive, the unfit, those who are ill, handicapped, inferior racial groups defined by deviation from Nordic ideals, and so on should be restricted in their ability to reproduce, indeed to live. Chase (1979) has shown with graphic clarity how this view would truncate opportunities for disadvantaged persons. According to Chase, Thomas Malthus' plan for population control goes like this:

> We should facilitate, instead of foolishly and vainly endeavoring to impede, the operations of nature in producing this mortality (of the "unfit")...Instead of recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. In our towns we should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, and court the return of the Plague. In the country, we should build our villages near stagnant pools, and particularly encourage settlements in all marshy and unwholesome situations. But above all, we should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases; and those benevolent, but much mistaken men, who have thought they were doing a service to mankind by projecting schemes for the total extirpation of particular disorders... (Malthus, , quoted in Chase, p. 6).

Because of the basic utilitarian and racist dogma, the social scientists who professed to follow Darwin in fact failed to appreciate a basic principle of his evolutionary theory; namely, that species survival was based on adaptability, AND that adaptability at the species level was enhanced by variability and diversity. Thus, what should be an argument for inclusion of diverse peoples in the society, became, rather, a program of systematic exclusion and denial.

The work of social psychologists was beginning to take on the empirical flavor of science and might indeed be considered the foundation of social science. Both the social Darwinists and IQ testers believed in social engineering, so there was implicit and often explicit advocacy for the uses of social psychology for the betterment of society. Morawski (1982) has provided us with a very interesting analysis of the roles leading psychologists and social psychologists played in advancing the notion of the social utility of scientific analysis and research. Morawski's analysis of the utopian writings of men like Watson, McDougall, Hall and Munsterberg show them to be believers in the Baconian moralism (science as an instrument of human improvement) as well as the Newtonian moralism (science as the instrument of rational pursuit of truth and understanding of human nature). However, it appears in each of these utopias that race is not a prominent feature except as a racial-centric Platonic IDEAL: a society of white, western and northern European protestants.

This paper will review the concept of race within the general point of view that suggests race was a vital, albeit pejorative and to my mind unwholesome, concept in the early foundations of social psychology both in terms of its primary role in the concept of the nature of man, and its potential significance for social engineering. It continued to be a vital concept over the years as the prevalence of a genetic interpretation of human motivation and performance gave way to an environmental one. However, in recent times, social psychology has rather lost interest in the concept; In part, because it does not "appear" to have basic theoretical significance; In part, because the problems with which it has been associated "appear" to have been largely solved; In part, because such as these problems continue,

it "appears" that the work of social psychologists has not finally proven to be effective for social engineering ends; and In part, because it "appears" to be the case that emergent scientific rigor in social psychology does not permit the race concept to play a major role in either conceptual or methodological formulations.

To review these general points, I will divide the history of social psychology into three periods corresponding roughly to 25 year cycles. Each phase has certain characteristics both in terms of the amount of attention paid to the concept of race, and to the quality or substance the concept has for our work.

BIO-EUGENIC ORIGINS AND RACIAL/CULTURAL DIFFERENCES--1900-1925

For convenience we begin the first phase of social psychology with the turn of the century. If we use McDougall's Social Psychology (1908) text as a marker, the emphasis on natural tendencies in the form of instinctive or motivational psychology places the influence on innate human capacities and predilections. This early era is concerned with the rising tide of immigration of peoples from all over the world, particularly eastern and southern Europe and Asia. To these new groups is added the continuing presence of black Americans whose role in this society has never been without contradiction. As noted earlier, the Social Darwinists were prominent among social scientists of the day, and the concern with survival was great. While his Social Psychology text did not deal directly with the concept of race (in fact, there is not mention in the index and the only place it surfaces is in the section on morality in which the problem of the Civil War and slavery is cited as an example of the development of higher morality on the part of Americans leading them to cease the practice of slavery.

However, McDougall confronts race squarely in a lesser known work, Is America Safe for Democracy? (1921). As was fashionable at the time, the peoples of Europe were divided into three basic racial stocks, Nordic (Germanic, Scandanavian, British), Alpine (French, Swiss, Baltic) and Mediterranean (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese). To the above were added Negroes, Red Men, Indians from India, and so on. The question addressed by McDougall is what will happen to their great nation if one permits people to willy nilly interact with population genetic consequences. He argues that all powerful civilizations of the past have enjoyed certain significant advantages by virtue of their genetic stock, and that their downfall has always come because that genetic stock has been diluted through intercourse with lesser peoples. McDougall spends most of the book identifying those superior attributes and show how Nordic peoples possess them in greater abundance than all others. What are these attributes?: intelligence (as measured by IQ tests of mental anthropologists which, according to McDougall, are "statistically valid"); and various aspects of character including anti-socioability; curisity, self-assertion; will power and providence (hoarding for the pleasure of it). McDougall offers a eugenics NEW PLAN for making the most of our scientific knowledge. If the problem is an anthropologic one; namely, that civilizations decline because the number of people of inferior genetic stock eventually exceeds those of superior stock, then the way to protect us is to reduce the birth rate of the inferior half to equal that of the superior half at the least, and to less than the superior half if we want to become the greatest civilization the world has ever known. So, for McDougall, it is simply a matter that tests show blacks and other races to be inferior, these inferiorities are genetic and these inferior groups are reproducing faster than the superior whites. Eugenics says, slow them down.

It is known that McDougall dabbled in Para psychology. Was by birth British, which suggests according to Andy Young that he might have had a constitutional predisposition toward racism. One might, therefore, tend to discount his ideas. However, let's listen to Floyd Allport, whose 1924 text is often cited with reverence for its foray into the empirical foundation of social psychology. Allport (1924) devoted two pages to the race question; excerpts are illuminating:

> The vast differences in cultural adaptation between primitive and civilized races are to be ascribed as much to "social inheritance" and environmental factors as to innate difference of capacity. It is fairly well established, however, that the intelligence of the white race is of a more versatile and complex order than that of the black race. It is probably superior also to that of the red or yellow races.[1]
>
> This discrepancy in mental ability is not great enough to account for the problem which centers about the American negro, or to explain fully the ostracism to which he is subjected. High emotionality and defect of inhibition are supplementary causes. The truth of this statement seems to be attested by a greater variability of blood pressure in the negro than in the white man,[2] as well as by overt indications...
>
> The heart of the negro question, however, is to be reached, not in the sphere of intelligence or temperament, but of s sociality. The negro has not been educated socially; his drives have not been conditioned or modified by agencies of social control. The reason why the negro tends to be asocial is that, growing up in an environment of poverty and ignorance, where stealth and depredation are often the accepted means of livelihood, he has had no opportunity for developing socialized traits.
>
> We often hear the charge that the more you educate the negro, the worse he becomes. This is unfair; for the negro, though less gifted than the white man, is highly educable ...The whole trouble has been that the moral side of his education was not begun soon enough. He becomes literate and learns the skilled trades; but the deeper foundations of early character training are lacking. The aim, therefore, should be not only for more education, but for earlier education. We need not so much colleges for members of the colored race as homes in which they can be properly reared. Specifically we need organized supervision of the moral influences brought to bear upon young negro children. (Allport, 1924, pp. 386-387)

While McDougall attributed black inferiority to the genes, Allport attributed it to BOTH the genes and the environment. Nevertheless, the position of Allport suggests the beginning of the shift from the strictly genetic interpretation to the environmental one. From Nature to Nurture. However, the question of basic inferiority was not challenged.

I have broken the first era at 1925 in part because Allport's book represents a new and more sophisticated approach to social psychology than earlier works, and the shift from nature to nurture has begun. Samelson (1978) also suggested in his analysis of trends in social psychology away from Racism and toward prejudice that the passage of the Immigration Restriction Law of 1924 stemmed the immigration trend and reduced for the moment, the pressure on the rapid increase of "inferior" peoples.* By 1925, the concern becomes more how shall these people live together.

SOCIO CULTURAL INFLUENCES AND SOCIO POLITICAL ACTION--THE NEGRO PROBLEM--1926-1955

The next phase of social psychological work on race is characterized by the concern for how people of different races view and behave toward one another. The notions of stereotyping were raised early on by Walter Lippman (1922), and given empirical attention by Katz and Braly (1935). The Social Distance work of Bogardus (1925) helped in the development of the techniques for assessing the degree of personal bias felt toward other groups on the basis of race. The concept of attitudes became during this era the most important concept in social psychology according to Allport (1935) and the premise that it was a precursor

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*It is commonly argued that the findings of racial differences in IQ tests for Blacks, and Europeans of Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean origin were used in support of the restriction of immigration and other eugenic plans. The psychologists of the time have been regularly accused of playing a major role in the passage of this Act. However, writing in a recent issue of the American Psychologist (Snyderman & Herrnstein, 1983) present evidence suggesting: a) that psychologists were not fully convinced that the data supported either the racial differences were as great as they appeared or that they provided support for immigration restriction; and b) that whatever the consensus among psychologists, the Congress was not persuaded by the data, but made their decision on other grounds. The Snyderman and Herrnstein argument will surely arouse those historians of the testing movement (cf., Kamin, 1976; Gould, 1981) and the definitive answer to these issues will await their debates.

to behavior AND could be imaginatively and relatively measured contributed to its lofty status. There were three major works of this era that should be duly noted: 1) Murphy and Murphy (1931) put together the first state of the art of empirical work in social psychology (with a major contribution from Newcomb in the 1937 edition); 3) the 1935 Handbook of Social Psychology was edited by Carl Murchison and included four chapters on the cultural histories of Black, White, Red and Yellow people; and 3) most significantly, the massive work of Gunnar Myrdal and colleagues, An American Dilemma (1944) framed the moral question of the so-called Negro Problem, the basic contradiction between the principle of equality found in the American Creed, and the fact of the substantial disadvantage and denial of basic human rights of black citizens of this country.

First, Experimental Social Psychology (Murphy & Murphy, 1931) was a little different from what we now think of as experimental. The Murphy's emphasized the contextual boundedness of culture AND the important role of history.

> It must be recognized that nearly all the experimental work in social psychology...has value and is definitely meaningful only in relation to the particular culture in which the investigation was carried on...Whether any of our (social psychology's) laws are really fundamental and necessary laws... can only be determined by experiment itself. Even the psychologist who has acquainted himself with but a few careful ethnological records will, we believe, have felt the massive significance of the historical approach...In this very epoch, the anthropologists have been working on their own social-psychological hypotheses, attempting to define the nature of "culture" and its transmission...In order to say anything really profound about the laws governing the transmission of culture, one would have had to understand the learning process...(and) as we do penetrate more and more into the nature of learning...we shall be able to use this anthropological material to greater and greater advantage. (pp. 7-8)

What the Murphy's are saying quite simply is that generalizations about the basic nature of human capacity are limited by the cultural/racial context, and that these limitations can be relieved by following the lead of anthropologists in learning more about cultural transmission. In the end, however, empirical and experimental work will be necessary if any lawful relationships are to be found. It is from this perspective that the Murphy's open their presentation of the experimental work of social psychology as of 1930.

There are two major themes concerning race in this volume; the first concerns the Nature-Nurture question with regard to intelligence; the second addresses inter-racial attitudes. A review of these studies is not necessary here, but suffice to say that the Murphy's take a skeptical view of the empirical support for racial differences citing the need for testing a wider range of abilities with regard to blacks, and citing inconsistent results with regard to Indians and Asians. The survey of studies of interracial attitudes was more concerned with the techniques for their assessment than with the prevalent and recurring finding that whites displayed more negative feelings as they were shown to be less educated, to live in the South or to be British! The overall emphasis on socialization of children, observation of cultural practices and the contextual and historical approaches standout as a good beginning for the empirical assessment of matters of race. We will see that this promise has not been realized in social psychological work.

Another promising approach is contained in the first Handbook of Social Psychology (Murchison, 1935). Of note is the attention paid to culture as presented by the Chapters on the Social Histories of Negroes (Herskovits);

Red Man (Wissler); White Man (Wallis) and Yellow Man (Harvey). All chapters were written by anthropologists, and all provided comprehensive histories of major racial groups in the world. The notions advanced by the Murphy's were continued by Murchison; namely, that anthropological data would be important to our understanding of the interaction and reactions of peoples of different racial/cultural origins. That social psychological generalization must take anthropological reality into account was taken for granted in the 1930's, but has since become an almost incidental concept in social psychology.*

Perhaps the cornerstone of the concept of race in social psychology is the massive and comprehensive volume of Dr. Gunnar Myrdal's, An American Dilemma (1944). The research for this volume enlisted the efforts of many social scientists concerned with the race question including Black social scientists such as Kenneth Clark, Charles and Guy Johnson, Allison Davis, St. Clair Drake, Ralph Bunche, and Sterling Brown and E. Franklin Frazier. In addition to these men, noted white social scientists such as Arnold Rose, Eugene Horowitz, Otto Klineberg, Samuel Stouffer, Melville Herskovits and Ashley Montague among others participated in this massive effort.

Stated simply, Myrdal's massive analysis reinforced a fundamental issue stated at the outset: "There is a Negro problem in the United States...(It) has distinctly negative connotations...(It) suggests something difficult to settle and difficult to leave alone...(It) makes for moral uneasiness. The

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*There are many notable exceptions but almost all of them fall in the category of critiques of social psychology calling at once for cultural contextual and historical concepts and decrying the experimental method as the culprit responsible for social psychology's crisis. I share some of these concerns and have made many of the same criticisms, but it is not my purpose here to dwell on this (cf. Pepitone, 1975; Gergen, 1973; Jones, 1983 for reviews of some of these positions).

very presence of the Negro in America...represents...an anomoly in the structure of American society..."The American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American (p. lxix, lxxi). This fact of social, economic, political psychological oppression of Black Americans contradicts in every detail the promise of the American Creed (freedom, justice and equality for all) and creates An American Moral Dilemma. The data contained in this volume document the degree of disadvantage of Blacks as well as the ignorance, apathy and basic racism of white Americans. The Negro problem is a moral issue and social science has charted for itself an action course designed to ameliorate this problem. Having gone outside the United States to obtain an impartial observer, and reinforced by the prestige and financial clout of the Carnegie Corporation, An American Dilemma set the stage for a mandate for change, and gave social scientists, particularly social psychologists, the "authority" to speak definitively on the subject.

We have now come full circle round. If McDougall's eugenics plan can be said to fairly represent the first era, then we have by now come to view the social engineering requirement as a modification of the attitudes, values and behavioral and environmental (not genetic) realities of Black and white citizens. The general view has moved from one that views each and every group as fundamentally racial and seeks a genetic solution to both the economic and political growth and possible decline of this nation, to the view that race is basically a social phenomenon and seeks a social psychological solution to what is conceived as a basic moral deficiency that threatens the strength of this nation. It is this latter view that perhaps reached its most far reaching expression in the 1954 Supreme Court case, Brown vs. Topeka. The social

science statement led to famous Footnote 11 in which the court cited social science research as the "Modern Authority" overturning Pleassy vs. Ferguson's prescription for racial segregation, and substituting a compelling need for racial integration.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL--DIVERGING PATHS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY--1955-1983

The third social psychological era is one characterized by diverging trends. The essence of my analysis of this period is contained in my recent chapter in the Review of Personality and Social Psychology (Jones, 1983). The Negro problem/Moral Dilemma approach to race set two basic parameters for our analysis of race, both of which created some problems for us. The first, is the issue of the "Negro Problem." The domination of the problem view set as priorities, understanding the negative heart of whites (i.e., prejudice an individualistic analysis of bias in social relations) and correspondingly the social pathology of blacks. These perspectives demanded a basically negative and ignoble view of both black and white Americans. The second aspect of the approach led, perhaps, to an uncritical moral chauvinism among social psychologists, such that the moral superiority of the goal took precedence over the basic objectivity of social scientific analysis. A recent paper by Gerard (1983) in the American Psychologist seems to imply as much.

The major works of social psychology during this era concerned either the characteristics of whites leading them toward negative bias such as the Harding, Kutner, Proshansky and Chein (1954) chapter in the 1954, Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey, 1954), or the tremendously influential Nature of Prejudice of Gordon Allport (1954). The Allport volume set the analytic tone for much of the research of this era in delineating the conditions of social integration that lead to positive attitudinal and behavioral consequences. The Contact Hypothesis, elucidated by Allport has been the driving force behind

most of the social psychological work on race relations in the past three decades. Added to this list could be my own small volume, Prejudice and Racism (Jones, 1972) which sought also to deal with bases of negative judgments and behaviors of whites. My analysis, however, went vack to both an historical and cultural/contextual view of race and racism. This view as we have seen was prominent in earlier writings, but by the 1950's and 1960's was rarely evoked.

The second type of work focused on the alleged social pathology of black Americans. Perhaps taking a cue from Kardiner and Ovesy's (1951) psychoanalytic assessment, as well as the documentation from the Myrdal work, it was widely accepted that black Americans suffered from oppression by manifesting a variety of pathologies from identification with the aggressor, lowered self-esteem, inability to delay gratification, too low or too high a level of aspiration, low achievement motivation, self-hate, social disorganization and so on. Pettigrew's, Profile of the Negro American (1964); Clark's, Dark Ghetto (1967), were two of the thorough studies of this perspective.

The major focus of the social problem approach, however, followed from the arguments for social integration contained in the 1954 social science statement to the Supreme Court. The premise for school integration (or to begin at the beginning, school desegration, is what Gerard (1983) calls the Lateral Value transmission hypothesis. This view states simply that black children suffer from lowered self-esteem (the Clark and Clark doll studies (1939) are most commonly cited in support of this notion) and that by putting them in a school environment with white children, they will improve their achievement levels by following the lead of higher achieving white peers and will therefore also improve their self-concept. This notion predicts the conclusions of Coleman (1966) nearly a decade after that black children have to go to school with whites in order to learn. One of the major approaches to this "requirement

for education" turns out to be bussing for school integration. Thus, the concept of race has in recent times turned to the basic question of social integration the means of achieving it and its positive consequences. As Cook (1979) has lamented, social psychologists have not proven to have clear and unequivocal data in support of either the practice or the goal. I argue that a combination of moral chauvinism, ethnocentrism and negative perspectives have conspired to short-circuit the practice of our profession in this area.

On the other side of this divergence is the corresponding growth of the rigorous experiment in social psychology. This rigorous experiment is a new phenomenon in social psychology. Whereas the Murphy's titled their book, Experimental Social Psychology, and highlighted the need for cross-cultural research to validate any generalization, the new experimental rigor was based on the theoretical derivation of postulates that were bound together by positivist logic and operational fiat. In short, an experimental rigor that was in a sense self-contained. The popularization of this new experimental creativity help to increase the self-esteem of social psychologists but appears to have played some role in the decline of race-related concepts in the forefront of social psychology. The twin characters of random assignment to condition and the proper use of control groups provide the foundation of experimental generalization, and both conditions face restrictions when we consider the facts of race ethnicity and culture.

In a review of empirical studies of race/culture and ethnicity in seven major social psychological journals over the past 15 years, I found a dramatic curvilinear frequency showing a peak in 1973 and declining substantially through 1980 (Jones, 1983). Looking further at the extent to which race-relevant studies were to be found in journals of agreed upon canons of experimental rigor, I found a negative association between experimental rigor,

and race related publications; and a positive association between rigor and the use of all-white subjects in studies of race-concepts. This latter finding simply illustrates the fact that race prejudice is easier to study with rigorous experimental techniques because whites are viewed as the target population and it is relatively easier to meet both random assignment and control requirements.

This tendency to emphasize studies of prejudice is also given support by comparing the treatment of race-related concepts like prejudice, race and racism, culture, black AMERICANS across social psychology textbooks. Using index citations as a guide, we find that textbooks published prior to 1960 show a tendency to give more attention to the race/culture concepts. However, textbooks after 1960 show a decided trend toward concern with the concept of prejudice.

Now arriving at the end of this era we find the concept of race in disarray. The major concerns with prejudice, social integration and the means by which the former are reduced by the latter do not seem to provide clear and convincing data. The moralistic fervor typified by the "Negro Problem" era has been diluted by other competing problems as well as the sense that with the passage of civil rights legislation and implementation of affirmative action, the problem is dramatically reduced. And finally, the growing sophistication of experimental and theoretical techniques have driven social problem work to the periphery, at least that moralistic form out of which race-concepts grew.

CONCLUSION

The concept of race appears to be diminishing in importance in social psychology. As an experimental variable, race occupies a second class position;

As a social/moral problem it now appears to be if not solved, at least but one of many that claim legitimacy in the social problem interests of social psychologists; as a theoretical concept it has never enjoyed a healthy integrated life, rather, has been driven more often by idealistic positions of both the right such as McDougall's eugenics; or the left by Myrdal's moralism. The subtlies of issues of race/ethnicity/culture have not been adequately teased apart so that each era of social psychology has failed to present a rounded integrated view of the complex interactions of individual and normative factors in human behavior.

I should acknowledge that conclusions very similar to mine were drawn by the chair of this symposium in his paper on the "Shaping of Social Psychology" at the APA convention in Washington last year (Smith, 1983). Smith notes that even prior to 1963, the mainstream concern for social problems of which racial issues were central was no longer the mainstream of social psychology. Lamenting this change, he offers the following observations, hopes and convictions:

> My bet is that in a few years our currently prevalent assumptions will appear to have been both too individualistic and too neglectful of the affective side of social life... I yearn for a social psychology that is genuinely interdisciplinary, that takes seriously the responsibility to provide linkage between individual and sociocultural levels of analysis...I merely declare my conviction that a scientific psychology that aspires to deal adequately with human social behavior must be in key respects a historical science that studies its phenomena in their historical and cultural context...(pp. 176-177).

If I could prescribe specific steps needed to resurrect the race concept in social psychology, they would include the following:

1. Revival of the concept of culture, the need for contexual and historical analysis and cross-cultural comparison.

2. Development of multidimensional models of human behavior with ecological adaptations; cultural evolution; and normative influences playing critical roles in the prediction and explanation of human behavior.

3. The work of ethnic/racial and cultural minorities in psychology must be consulted and collaborative projects undertaken. We know very little about the interaction of reactive or adaptive parameters of development and the evolution of cultural givens. An implication of this view is the notion that difference is not and should not be synonymous with deficiency. Also implied is the need to revive some ethnographic methods, basically descriptive in nature in the service of conceiving some new questions answers to which may require the development of new methodologies.

The broad implication of these prescriptions for the next era are contained in a summary statement by Latane and Wolf (1981).

> In the face of changing times and conditions, majorities continue to convince each other of the truths of the past, whereas minority positions may be fresher, more elegant or realistic than those of the outmoded majority. The insistent behavior of the minority thus forces the majority to attend to the discrepancy between its position and the current state of the world, creating the conditions for a profound and often rapid change in the status quo. Thus the minority may serve mainly as a trigger to create an explosive release from the powerful conformity pressures exerted by the majority...(pp.451-452).

The development of a fully conceived, articulated researched and applied concept of race will make a great contribution to the maturity and significance of social psychology. I look forward to the next era of our work on race concepts with hope and anticipation.

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